Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith can have lifeless faith in the other articles?
This post is a continuation of the discussion which began on Iacobus' post of this morning. I add it to our main page because the text which I cite from St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica is, I think, of general interest. His words are so strong and so foreign to our modern ears that it will be refreshing to return to the thought of him whose ensign is the sun.The question for discussion in Secunda Secundae Partis, Question 5, Article 3 asks:
"Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith can have lifeless faith in other articles?" And the answer?
NO.
"Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic [e.g., a protestant] who disbelieves one article of faith."
Objection 1. It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a Catholic. Now a Catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of lifeless faith.
Objection 2. Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe some articles of faith without believing the others.
Objection 3. Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can believe some articles, and disbelieve others.
On the contrary, Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith, after a man disbelieves one article.
I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.
The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will.
Reply to Objection 1. A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.
Reply to Objection 2. The various conclusions of a science have their respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.
Reply to Objection 3. The various precepts of the Law may be referred either to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment, according to James 2:10: "Whosoever shall . . . offend in one point is become guilty of all."go to main page
by Iosephus @ 10/25/2005 10:45:00 PM
8 comments
St. Louis-Marie de Montfort, ora pro nobis
St. Joseph, ora pro nobis
St. Ambrose of Milan, ora pro nobis
St. Dominic, ora pro nobis
St. Francis (and St. Clare), orate pro nobis
St. Catherine of Siena, ora pro nobis
St. Alphonsus Ligouri, ora pro nobis
St. John Chrysostom, ora pro nobis
8 Comments:
What's going on here is that there is equivocation concerning the term 'faith' as used by the various parties to this discussion. St. Thomas is talking about the theological virtue of faith, whereas most of the commentators to Iacobus' post were using 'faith' to refer to something like "holding true beliefs." Now I'll be the first to admit that the second sense of faith is far inferior to the first, and that as Catholics we are called to the theological virtue. Nonetheless, the second sense is useful as well, and it is far from intelligible to say that even heretics are able to possess faith in this mediated sense, which can then become a gateway to holding the fullness of faith.
Such, Dr. A, was the point I was making to Iosephus. We need to be careful to distinguish between a natural faith, so called, and the proper virtue of Faith. Naturally, you are correct to acknowledge the superiority of the theological usage, and indeed it has been confusion between these usages that seems to have occasioned the dispute from the first.
There may well be an equivocation here, but I certainly don't think that faith, even in the second sense, means "holding true beliefs." We just call that "holding true beliefs." "Holding true beliefs on authority, or, on some certain kind of authority" might count as this inferior sense of faith.
Now if an equivocation were apart of the miscommunication in the discussion today, surely what we wanted to talk about was the theological virtue. For, while we are surely not saved just by the theological virtue of faith alone, so much the less will we be saved by merely human faith, whatever this amounts to.
If we were considering the trajectory onto which Brownson put us--I think it at least worth considering what he has to say--he clearly has in mind the theological virtue.
What does it matter that some people, outside the Church, hold true beliefs on the basis on some authority?? We do this all the time; so much of our knowledge, to speak loosely, comes on the authority of other people. But generally, we do not admire a person when they have more of their knowledge on the basis of another's authority: we respect faith, rather, when it is held on the right kind of authority, namely God's. Now no one outside of the Church holds what he holds on God's authority because, as Aquinas says here, nothing false can come under the virtue of faith, a virtue which perfects the intellect.
I hope I'm not indulging in the same equivocation here at the end. Even if I am, I hope that we can see now to take the discussion in a new direction.
I agree that there are multiple usages of faith flying about. I would claim that there are three:
1. The "secular" virtue of faith by which we might call pagans or Muhammedans faithful to the false Gods imagined by their creeds.
2. The Catholic theological virtue, addressed by St. Thomas, which if acted against removes one from the Mystical Body of Christ.
3. Some "combination" of the two, in that the secular faith is applied to some right doctrines. It might be better than being a pagan (or if entered into willfully, worse), but has none of the characteristics of true Catholic Faith.
I have serious concerns about employing this third usage without clarity, and without reason. I completely agree with Doctor Asinorum and others in that #1 makes one inclined to #2, and #3 even more so. But ecumenical statements like "a common faith in baptism" seem to have no reason but civility. If anything, they confuse everyone about the nature of faith #2.
First, since this post will follow directly on iacobus' below, I will post this right away. This comes from Pope John Paul II's "Ut unum sint" ("That they may be one")which deals with this subject of ecumenism:
"It needs be reaffirmed in this regard that acknowledging our brotherhood is not the consequence of a large-hearted philanthropy or a vague family spirit. It is rooted in recognition of the oneness of Baptism and the subsequent duty to glorify God in his work. The Directory for the Application of Principles and Norms on Ecumenism expresses the hope that Baptisms will be mutually and officially recognized.70 This is something much more than an act of ecumenical courtesy; it constitutes a basic ecclesiological statement."
In substance that doesn't disagree with anything anyone has said -- we agree, I think, that all validly baptized people are initiated to the faith and receive the graces of that Sacrament -- but this statement seems to suggest a somewhat different attitude towards the matter than some participants in this conversation would advise.
Regarding the quote from St. Thomas, I'm not sure that I'm convinced that the theological virtue of faith is really out of reach of non-Catholics. He does appear to be saying that it is, and I think I grasp his reasons for saying what he does about it. But his fundamental idea seems to be that it is not sufficient to assent to propositions, even true propositions, on the basis of one's own rational deliberations or because, for whatever reason, they express something that one simply wishes to believe. The believer must have as his object the truth; this is the habit of faith. Believing true things for any other reason than that they are part of the whole, unitary truth, is like believing scientific truths because someone has promised to pay you for doing so even though you don't understand them. Truth really isn't the motivating force.
Fine, fair enough. But if it were possible for a person to have truth as their object while not (out of invincible ignorance) recognizing the authority of the Church, it seems to me that they could still have the correct attitude towards truth. The key is a dedication to truth above all other things, and the willingness to modify one's beliefs and life according to any truths that one receives. That's why the person who CONSCIOUSLY picks out certain aspects of the faith and decides not to believe them has destroyed the virtue entirely; they have demonstrated that they don't have this willingness to follow the truth, and, that being the case, it really doesn't matter how many other truths they happen to keep out of habit or convenience. But why couldn't it be possible for a person to have the correct attitude without realizing that the Catholic Church is the best source of the truth that they genuinely desire?
It actually seems to me that Newman's writings (separately posted by Iosephus) support this point. First of all, Newman states that IF Protestants were to believe in their own religions, and adopt an attitude that seems to me similar to the one St. Thomas advises, this WOULD BE faith; he just doesn't think that they do. But even then, he uses no universal quantifiers; he just thinks that THE GREAT MAJORITY of them have no faith. To me this to acknowledge the possibility that some of them might actually have faith. And this seems particularly fitting, because Newman himself seems to be an excellent example of someone who does seem to have had faith before he actually submitted to the Church. He was committed to ordering his life in accordance with truth, and, after much careful study and deliberation, he concluded (very reluctantly) that this would require him to be a Roman Catholic. So he did it. But presumably the committment to truth came before, or why the years of burning anguish over whether or not this was a necessary step?
I was going to include more citations from the encyclical to show that Pope John Paul II thought that Protestants can have faith in Christ, but, once again, must run to class. Catch you all later.
It might be good for Clara to give us a look-see at those quotations from Ut Unum Sint. I would think that believing in Christ is one thing and having the theological virtue of Faith is another.
What we are concerned about is the theological virtue of Faith. This faith is the gift of God. Does God give half-gifts? Certainly, as Doctor Asinorum said last night, some are stronger in this virtue than others, but this is consistent with it being the case that one has it or one does not have it.
Take the case of charity. If we are in a state of grace, we have this theological virtue in our hearts or souls or wherever. Please God, I am in a state of grace, but my charity is nowhere near that which was found in the breast of St. Alphonsus Maria de'Liguori.
Yet if I were to commit a mortal sin, I would lose charity altogether; not have a big set back, not go back almost all the way to zero, but all the way to zero. It's there and then it's gone. The same would have been true if, perish the thought, St. Alphonsus had ever committed a mortal sin. Or have I misrepresented the matter?
Now Aquinas is saying the same thing about the virtue of Faith, I think. Either I assent to the Church as the infallible rule of faith or I do not. Once I do assent, I can grow in this virtue. For instance, my will can become practiced in moving my intellect to assent to the dogmas of the Church even as more and more serious doubts are raised for my intellect consider. One can assent quickly, one can assent more slowly: both have the faith, though one is stronger in that virtue.
Aquinas knows that there are people outside of the Church who believe in the divinity and manhood of Christ, for example. But he says: "whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith."
So he allows for that situation.
But Clara objects: some of those people are invincibly ignorant. Grant it . . . but what do we conclude? That they have faith? No, for we would deny the very thing which Thomas has said! At the least, we must find something else to say about those cases.
Inculpable as they may be, we cannot twist the meaning of the word faith, as in, the theological virtue of faith, to say that they have it when they do not. Would they have faith if certain contrary-to-fact conditions obtained? Sure! But what does this tell us? It's also true that if certain other conditions obtained, everyone would be saved, for no one is under the necessity of being damned.
Is it helpful to say that everyone has faith, either in fact or counterfactually? And then not to worry about the people who only counterfactually have faith because they would have it if only they weren't invincibly ignorant (as many of them as are)?
I readily grant invincible ignorance under circumstances which I do not understand nor am I prepared to define; indeed, it seems clear that we cannot. But I do not see that we can take a sense from Aquinas' words other than that one has faith or one does not; and to have faith, it is necessary and sufficient to be a Catholic. In other words, to have faith is simply to be a Catholic--which is precisely what Newman says in the passage from his piece which I quoted for you all.
Now Aquinas is saying the same thing about the virtue of Faith, I think. Either I assent to the Church as the infallible rule of faith or I do not. Once I do assent, I can grow in this virtue.
I would agree with Clara in that this is not as clear an analogy as we might wish. Certainly a deliberate act against faith just as against charity will remove that virtue completely. And it seems from St. Thomas that anyone who does not assent wholly to the Catholic faith, loses the habit of faith completely.
But as Clara points out, there are many who seem to have the virtue of faith, in that they wholly assent to some false Christian faith, in a manner perhaps inwardly like Catholics. They desire truth. Moreover, they are by baptism, children of the Church. It then becomes hard to pinpoint the moment at which they lost the Faith - unless we use the age of reason.
If we then introduce "invincible ignorance" on a massive scale, we would be forced to say that some lost the habit of faith at the age of reason, others when they ceased to become ignorant, and some have clearly not lost it at all. I just don't see this as being compatible with traditional descriptions of the unity of the Church. As Iosephus said, we are members of the Church with the habit of faith to some degree(as with Charity), or we are not a member and have no Faith.
On another point, you suggest that the correct attitude towards truth can make up the habit of faith in the absence of knowledge about the Church's authority. That is, to have faith requires assent to the true authority, unless you don't know which authority is right, in which case the disposition towards truth and some authority (and we feel more inclined to allow for this if this authority is Christian in name) is all that is required. But this would seem to include all, or atleast most heretics throughout the ages. Most of these heretics probably sought the truth, even in their conscious rejection of doctrine. Or, at least, their descendants had authority in the traditions of their particular heresy to assent to. I think, with Iosephus, that you cannot have Faith without both assent and the object of that assent being true Catholic authority.
Yes, I think perhaps I should put together some of those quotes from Ut Unum Sint for us to look at. I'll try to do that sometime soon, and maybe post that in a separate post on the blog. I admit that maintaining my position may commit me to saying that St. Thomas didn't get this issue entirely right, though as my last post shows, I don't think we'd disagree too sharply. But we can bring this up again when I get a chance to put those quotes together.
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